Showing posts with label changing protocols. Show all posts
Showing posts with label changing protocols. Show all posts

Saturday, August 29, 2009

NST Online Doctors now have clearer picture

NST Online Doctors now have clearer picture

Shared via AddThis

NST 2009/08/29

KUALA LUMPUR: Private doctors now have a clearer picture on how to deal with people having influenza-like symptoms.

This followed a dialogue cum briefing by Health Minister Datuk Seri Liow Tiong Lai and Director-General of Health Tan Sri Dr Ismail Merican on Thursday.

Malaysian Medical Association president Dr David Quek said the session gave them a wider view of what was expected of them in terms of managing and treating patients with influenza-like illness (ILI).

He said although doctors were doing their best to treat patients and refer those suspected of having influenza A (H1NI) to hospital, they were in a dilemma as there were no proper guidelines initially from the ministry and the World Health Organisation.


However, after four months of closely monitoring and analysing the situation, the ministry came out with its clinical guidelines on who should be treated with anti-viral drugs and also recently by the WHO.

Dr Quek said although there were policies, directives and guidelines on the handling of the H1N1 pandemic, interpretation was a problem.

He said no one, including WHO, knows much about the new virus and everyone is doing their best to handle the situation.

"There may have been slip-ups earlier in the management of cases but now doctors are clearer as to what is expected of them although we would much prefer that we be given a free hand in managing the cases."

He said the district and state health departments should explain clearly to private doctors and hospitals in their areas of the clinical guidelines.

The Federation of Private Medical Practitioners' Association of Malaysia president Dr Steven Chow said they had asked all doctors to submit the daily information on ILI cases to the ministry and said the ministry should make anti-virals affordable.

Meanwhile, Dr Ismail said another 391 people have contracted the H1N1 virus while death toll remains at 71.

Thursday, August 27, 2009

H1N1: Health Minister Dialogue with Private Medical Practitioners, 27 August 2009

H1N1: Dialogue Tomorrow Between Health Minister And Private
Medical Practitioners



Dialogue with Minister of Health
27 August 2009, Thursday

3.30 pm at
Health Ministry's Operations Room,
Level 4, Block E7,
Parcel E, Putrajaya

August 26, 2009 18:15 PM

KUALA LUMPUR, Aug 26 (Bernama) -- A dialogue between Health Minister
Datuk Seri Liow Tiong Lai and private medical practitioners on
handling influenza A(H1N1) cases will be held Thursday at the
ministry.

Health Director-General Tan Sri Dr Mohd Ismail Merican said all
private practioners were very much encouraged to attend to clarify
handling of cases of influenza-like-illness (ILI) that are suspected
to be of influenza A(H1N1).

The dialogue is scheduled to be held at 3pm at the Health Ministry's
Operations Room, Level 4, Block E7, Parcel E, Putrajaya, he said in a
media statement on the current situation of H1N1 in the country.

On the current situation, Dr Mohd Ismail said one death was registered
today after being confirmed by the Mortality Review Committee.

The victim as a 24-year-old woman who is the 71st victim after the
cause of death was confirmed to be "H1N1 with Acute Respiratory
Distress Syndrome (ARDS)".

Dr Mohd Ismail also said 1,446 ILI patients were receiving treatment
at 98 hospitals, including two private hospitals, throughout the
country.

Of that number only 217 patients (15 per cent) were positive for H1N1.

"Of the 217 cases confirmed for H1N1, 51 cases were in the ICU where
nine cases were new admittances while two patients were moved out of
the ICU," he said in a media statement here Wednesday.

Dr Mohd Ismail said of the 51 cases being treated in the ICU, 39 cases
(76 per cent) had high risks like chronic diseases (21 cases), obesity
(9), children/infants (6), post natal case (1) and Down Syndrome (2).

On the global situation, Dr Mohd Ismail said a World Health
Organisation (WHO) report said the number of cases till Aug 26 was
239,985 with 2,601 deaths and this indicated that the spread of the
H1N1 pandemic was still active affecting 182 countries.

The WHO in its report also reminded that the figures presented did not
reflect the true picture of the situation as the organisation now did
not make it compulsory for cases to be reported, he said.

Saturday, August 22, 2009

Tamiflu-resistant H1N1 may have spread in Singapore

Tamiflu-resistant H1N1 may have spread in Singapore

SINGAPORE, Aug 22 — Resistance to Tamiflu has been detected in a patient in Singapore who was down with the pandemic Influenza A (H1N1) bug. Similar cases have also emerged in Hong Kong, China, Japan, Canada, the United States and Denmark.

When the novel strain first appeared in April, the antiviral worked well against it. The World Health Organisation (WHO) feels that these instances of it not working are isolated cases of resistance that have developed because Tamiflu had been used at lower, prophylactic doses in people who might have been exposed to the bug.

Because these so-called contacts were, in fact, already infected, the lower doses turned out to be suboptimal, which allowed resistance to emerge. There is no proof that resistance is circulating in the community at large, the WHO asserts.

Yet there is at least one documented case of a 16-year-old girl who fell ill while travelling from San Francisco to Hong Kong on June 11. Though she declined Tamiflu, an isolate from her was found to carry the H274Y mutation, which signals Tamiflu-resistance.

She was, however, not the world’s first case of such resistance, an honour belonging to a woman seen in Denmark in late June. When she got home from Britain, she was given Tamiflu prophylaxis. Yet she still fell ill on the fifth day of taking Tamiflu. H274Y was detected in her isolate.

Could she have been infected in Britain by someone carrying mainly Tamiflu-sensitive bugs but also a small population of resistant bugs? In that case, suboptimal Tamiflu dosage might have suppressed enough of the sensitive bugs to prevent any clinical symptoms. Over the five days, however, the resistant bugs could have replicated enough to predominate and thus cause clinical illness.

But if this is so, then the mutation must already have been circulating in Britain — which, however, has not reported any cases of Tamiflu resistance yet. Alternatively, she might have caught the resistant bug in Denmark itself, during the five days when she was well and ambulant.

One reason for suspecting community circulation of the resistant bug is that 98 per cent of all seasonal H1N1 bugs now carry H274Y. If patients are infected with both strains, that mutation could jump from seasonal flu to pandemic flu. But the WHO insists there is no evidence this has occurred, so all resistant cases must have emerged because of suboptimal Tamiflu dosages.

There are signs of community circulation in the US, at least. First, the genomics of the Hong Kong isolate where no Tamiflu was used suggests that the infection originated in the US.

Second, it was revealed only this month that a May 30 isolate taken from a young American woman returning to Singapore from Honolulu carried H274Y.

Flying on May 26, she fell ill on board the plane, was hospitalised here on May 27, was confirmed to be a H1N1 case on May 28, but was discharged on May 31 feeling well.

Although her May 28 sample was Tamiflu-sensitive, her May 30 sample had H274Y. Two days is probably too short an interval for resistance to develop from any suboptimal dosages of Tamiflu. At any rate, as a confirmed case, she would have been given the full dosage.

Thus it is entirely possible that she was infected in the US with both the sensitive and resistant strains, which her immune defences could have cleared quickly, so she was discharged fairly quickly.

Third, on Aug 15, the US authorities sent out an urgent report to physicians that two intensive care patients in Washington state who had been infected last month and treated aggressively with Tamiflu were found to have bugs with H274Y.

These four cases suggest that H274Y may already be circulating in the US. It is possible we are seeing relatively few of these isolates for a technical reason: All published genomes are consensus sequences of DNA. That is, the base that is considered to occupy a specific position on the genome is the one that occurs most frequently. But it needs do so 100 per cent of the time.

If a base occurs in only 10 per cent of viral particles, it isn’t likely to show up in the published sequence. It is only when a base occurs in, say, half the cases that it might appear in the consensus sequence.

If H274Y were found in, say, 10 per cent of viral particles, it won’t appear in the consensus sequence of samples taken from a patient prior to Tamiflu being used. Once Tamiflu is employed, the population of sensitive bugs would be drastically reduced. However, those with H274Y would flourish.

Thus, although it was already around prior to Tamiflu being used, the resistant bug would not be detected. After the drug is employed, however, the resistant bugs can grow to greater numbers than the sensitive ones, rendering them detectable.

Of course, if more samples are taken before Tamiflu is used, H274Y might be detected more often. Such comprehensive surveillance, however, would consume too much resources.

History suggests it was limited testing that enabled Tamiflu-resistance in seasonal Influenza A (H1N1) to creep up on the world unawares. The first instance of that was detected in Norway in spring last year.

By the 2008/2009 season, however, it was found in 98 per cent of bugs worldwide. Yet a re-testing of old samples showed that H274Y was already widespread by the autumn of 2007. This means it was circulating in the community before it was first detected in Norway last year.

Is history repeating itself? If so, Singapore should be stocking up on Relenza, the other antiviral that still works. — Straits Times

Healthy people with swine flu do not need Tamiflu, says WHO

Healthy people with swine flu do not need Tamiflu, says WHO

LONDON, Aug 22 — Healthy people who catch swine flu need not be given Tamiflu, the World Health Organisation (WHO) has announced. The advice appears to contradict the UK’s policy of making the antiviral drug readily available to those who call the national pandemic helpline or approach their GPs.

Hundreds of thousands of doses have been given to British patients although the majority have not been severely ill. Fears have been voiced that mass use of Tamiflu will make the virus resistant to it.

The latest advice from the WHO said: “Worldwide, most patients infected with the pandemic virus continue to experience typical influenza symptoms and fully recover within a week, even without any form of medical treatment. Healthy patients with uncomplicated illness need not be treated with antivirals.”

Previously the WHO had said antivirals should be given to patients with “serious progressive illness”. The new guidance is the first time it has specifically advised against otherwise healthy individuals being given the drug.

The recommendation is based on the conclusion of an international panel of experts that includes representatives from the UK. The advice added that Tamiflu, also called oseltamivir, and the similar drug Relenza, also called zanamivir, should be given quickly to seriously ill or deteriorating patients.

The WHO guidance said at-risk groups should receive the drugs. “For patients with underlying medical conditions that increase the risk of more severe disease, WHO recommends treatment with either oseltamivir or zanamivir.

“These patients should also receive treatment as soon as possible after symptom onset, without waiting for the results of laboratory tests. As pregnant women are included among groups at increased risk, WHO recommends that they receive antiviral treatment as soon as possible after symptom onset.”

Some medical researchers have expressed concern about the side-effects of Tamiflu, particularly sickness, nightmares and insomnia in children. A team from Oxford University said this month that children with mild symptoms should not be given Tamiflu and urged the Department of Health (DoH) to urgently rethink its policy.

Figures released by the DoH show that 45,986 courses of antivirals were given to patients in England in the week ending 18 August. In the previous week 90,363 courses of antivirals were given out. The data relates to people collecting the drugs after an assessment via the National Pandemic Flu Service. Many more have collected antivirals via their GP.

The DoH said the new WHO guidance was not too different from its own position that people with mild symptoms could recover without antiviral drugs.

The new WHO statement said: “Worldwide, around 40 per cent of severe cases are now occurring in previously healthy children and adults, usually under the age of 50 years. Some of these patients experience a sudden and very rapid deterioration in their clinical condition, usually on day five or six following the onset of symptoms.”

The first deaths of patients in Wales and Northern Ireland with swine flu has been announced, bringing the number of UK deaths to 61. In Wales, a 55-year-old woman was admitted to the Royal Gwent hospital in Newport on 2 August and given antiviral drugs. She developed cardiac problems and died on Saturday.

In Northern Ireland, a female patient who was said to have had an underlying health condition died last night in hospital. No further details were released.

The Department of Health has hinted that accumulating evidence about the degree of severity of the outbreak might lead to a change in policy. A spokesman said: “We believe a safety-first approach of offering antivirals, when required, to everyone remains a sensible and responsible way forward. However we will keep this policy under review as we learn more about the virus and its effects.”

“The WHO recommendations are in fact in line with UK policy on antivirals. We have consistently said that many people with swine flu only get mild symptoms and they may find bed rest and over-the-counter flu remedies work for them.

“WHO state that 40 per cent of severe cases worldwide have been in previously healthy children and adults and that serious cases should be treated immediately. This emphasises the need not to become complacent about the mildness of the illness and the reasoning behind a precautionary policy.

“People with underlying health conditions, pregnant women and parents with children under the age of one should speak to their GP if they have symptoms. If people have any doubts about taking antivirals they should contact their GP.” — Guardian

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My Comments:

A(H1N1) flu as a novel disease has no precedent on what is the absolutely correct approach.... Just another potentially confusing conflicting situation, which shows up the shifting uncertainties of handling this pandemic H1N1 flu, even by the WHO...

Malaysians should not be too ready to confer blame on authorities and doctors when most of these approaches/directives are also changing/modifying from the world's highest authorities...

However, many Malaysians are now so suspicious and cynical as to anything smacking of governmental conspiracy and obfuscation, that we seem to have lost the art of rational discourse (sigh!), someone or everyone who collaborates, must be blamed! Including the harbinger of news or information, no matter how apolitical, so sad...

Friday, August 21, 2009

Nutgraph Version: A(H1N1): Still under control

A(H1N1): Still under control

21 Aug 09 : 5.55PM

By Dr David KL Quek
editor@thenutgraph.com

WHAT are the current and potential problems doctors might be facing in combating the spread of the swine flu?

It would be good if every doctor kept a constant and close tab on the H1N1 pandemic, and remained fully aware of the developments and changes, which are evolving daily. Logging on to the internet regularly for more updated information would certainly help.

Picture of a stethoscope
(Pic by Barky / sxc.hu)


Every doctor has to be more proactive and practise more responsible and cautious medical professionalism during this trying period, which is expected to go on for one to two years. Importantly, they must assiduously look out for lung complications, quickly identify high-risk profiles, and refer these patients promptly for further specialised care.

Easier access to antiviral drugs and responsible use and monitoring would help allay public fears of delayed treatment, but this should be with care. There is genuine fear that the precious antiviral drug might be used indiscriminately for prevention; this could inadvertently create the worse outcome of drug-resistant bugs.

However, in light of the very quick deterioration and death of some young patients, it might be prudent to use antiviral treatment earlier and more aggressively.

We look forward to the specific H1N1 vaccine when it does come our way, probably towards the end of the year. In the meantime, encouraging those in the front line, heart or lung patients, and frequent travellers to have the seasonal flu vaccination is a useful adjunct to help stem the usual problems from other flu types

We are facing some problems with health insurance companies. This is especially the case in private hospitals, where many insurance companies are refusing to reimburse for the treatment because it appears that pandemic illness is excluded from the contract for medical insurance. Hence, it is good that Etiqa health insurance has come forward to state publicly that the H1N1 flu is a reimbursable illness.

Is the government's current logistics capable of handling this outbreak, or a second or third wave of the flu as predicted?

It is difficult to say at this time. We certainly hope that this second or third wave will not take place. It is almost a certainty that the community spread of the A(H1N1) flu in Malaysia will escalate, and more and more Malaysians will come down with this flu.

However, the MMA wishes to reiterate that most of these infections would be quite mild and require only symptomatic treatment, bedrest and close watch at home. Only a minority (perhaps 2% to 5%) may require hospital care or more.

If these very severe complications occur in a staggered manner, then we can cope with the problem. But if a huge unprecedented outbreak of very severe complications takes place, this can easily overwhelm the system. That said, contingency plans of equipping general wards with intensive care capacities, or even field hospitals, have been made.

There are also structured plans to increase the country's intensive care bed capacity to at least twice the number available now (which is around 300 beds only). However, training sufficient staff and specialists to provide such care may require more time and expert guidance.

Should all doctors advise their patients to self-quarantine if they display symptoms?

Yes, this is the message that we have been advocating: it is best for all doctors to advise their patients to self-quarantine if they display flu-like symptoms. This is the first and most basic step in curbing the spread of the disease.

Would the MMA describe the current A(H1N1) pandemic as "out of control"?

At this juncture, the MMA does not believe that the situation is out of control and that we need any health curfew. The health minister yesterday announced that the government would only consider declaring a health curfew if the mortality rate due to influenza A(H1N1) outbreak goes above 0.4%. According to their calculations, currently, the country's mortality rate is between 0.1% and 0.4%.

Some have suggested that we shut down the country by imposing a nationwide health emergency lockdown. But this is quite futile as the disease is already in place within the community.


Microscopic view of influenza virus particles (Pic by Dr FA
Murphy, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; source:
ah1n1.com)


How long should a shutdown go on for? One week, 10 days, or longer? What about the economic implications and the day-to-day running of the country and businesses? What happens when another surge appears? Do we need to have repeated cycles of national curfew?

It makes no practical sense to even consider this at this time. The actual numbers, while alarming to some, are still manageable.

So why do the growing numbers seem to imply that we are getting more and more infections, with what appears as a disproportionate number of deaths?

There is no clear or adequate answer to this. I do not believe that the Health Ministry is to blame for the forthright transparency, which it has been practising right from the outset.

There is organisational acknowledgement that our viral testing may have been less than adequate, and there have been long queues and frustrations from many worried patients, some of whom were sent home with no tests offered. Thus, there were and are many flu patients in the community who have not had confirmatory tests performed. This under-reporting would add to the lower numbers of laboratory-proven or confirmed A(H1N1) flu infections.

The World Health Organisation has estimated that for every confirmed case, there are at least another 20 patients who would have been infected. This means that most of these are not serious enough to be counted. Many would have had mild or even no symptoms. In this context, the actual numbers would have been grossly underestimated.

So it is unfair to state that the Health Ministry is manipulating the numbers to justify the growing death rate, which we have already predicted would happen simply based on the attack rate of this contagious flu.

We must inform the public that this pandemic will continue for at least another year or two, with the intensity likely to become less serious and less feared with time, unless the dreaded second wave of reassortment into a more virulent form of the H1N1 virus takes place. There is no indication that this second wave has taken place yet, even in Mexico, USA, UK or Australia.

Also, the complication rates appear to have plateaued, and most health authorities have learnt to cope with this and the expected number of deaths. The scenario in Malaysia is probably still evolving, with the peak still to come, but I would predict that the mortality rate would become less frightening as we cope with the complications better.

It is possible that many more Malaysians in the country have come into contact with this flu and are suffering very mildly from it. Most would have got better without much concern. It is those few who seem to get complications so quickly that make us afraid.

As with most communicable diseases, we will overcome this outbreak in time, but we need to be patient, vigilant and socially responsible, and work together.

Dr David KL Quek
President
Malaysian Medical Association

A (H1N1) Influenza Pandemic Response & the Malaysian Medical Association

1. How is MMA helping in this pandemic? Some doctors and the public have lamented that it does not appear to have done enough…


The MMA is a professional body, which represents the largest number of doctors in the country, but we are also responsible toward any health crisis or threat to the country and our citizens.


Right from the outset, the MMA has been invited as an important dialogue partner in the National Influenza Pandemic Task Force, the Inter-Ministerial Influenza Pandemic Committee, and even the National Emergency Council pertaining to this A(H1N1) influenza crisis. In fact, our participation started even before this, while the MOH was planning for the much-feared but still remote H5N1 bird flu possible pandemic, a few years ago.


Our views and input have been welcomed by health ministry officials, as we grapple with a clearly novel and previously unknown health threat. Clearly we are participating in every possible way to lend our expertise and strength of diverse knowledge to this national crisis.


When a country and its population are hit by a pandemic disease, in this case A (H1N1), everyone has to work together as a team and not individually to combat the disease. The main ‘leader’ is of course the Ministry of Health but the rest of us have to join forces with them to come up with a contingency plan.


It is becoming increasingly clear that this is no easy task, and translating policies down to proper and appropriate practical responses and ground-level implementation can be challenging, and would be less than clockwork precision.


The MMA cannot work alone on this. We do not have the regulatory clout nor the logistical machinery to enforce decisions, which have been formulated by the Ministry of Health, as our member doctors are distributed far and wide across differing terrains and locales.


However, we have been disseminating our information to all our doctor members the best way we can, so that collectively we can help ameliorate the more serious consequences of this pandemic. We are working closely with Association of Private Hospitals, the Academy of Family Physicians, and the Federation of Private Medical Practitioner Associations of Malaysia, to ensure that we are up to mark in offering alternative health care sites in the private sector to help treat this disease in as uniform a manner as possible, i.e. in private clinics and private hospitals, and have been doing this from the beginning.


Our private practitioner clinics are already working fulltime with the constraints of not being able to carry out confirmatory testing for the A(H1N1) flu, and also the very limited access to the antiviral drugs which were previously stockpiled by the MOH. It is only now, that we are able to purchase (still) in limited amounts the antiviral medicines for possible use in complicated H1N1 flu.


Many clinics in more remote areas are still finding great difficulties in getting supply of such in-demand specific medicines. Thus there is growing frustration and some sense of hopelessness and worry that we cannot act better and more promptly for our very ill patients.


We have already informed our members that they should be very prudent in using these drugs, because we do not wish to dish antiviral medicines out to just anyone who demand for it, and so encourage the wasteful and possible future development of resistant viral types.


GPs have also been giving out seasonal flu vaccines to those with higher risk of contracting the bug, although this does not necessarily help to protect against this new strain of A(H1N1). Higher risk patients may benefit from this prevention exercise.


Thus it is fair to say that the MOH and government cannot go solo in this, and private doctors have already been mobilized to help fight this disease. Logistic problems remain which undermines the best that doctors can do or respond most rapidly.


2. There is a perception that private doctors are not adequately engaged in the management of this A(H1N1) influenza pandemic. Are private doctors willing to pitch in if the situation gets out of control?


This is not true. Most of our doctors are actively engaged in looking after many flu-like illness patients, but find many constraints due to lack of access to specific treatment modalities. The lack of available and reliable testing and difficulty in confirming such illness as due to this A(H1N1) flu, compounds the situation, when many patients demand to know for sure. Doctors are thus left quite alone to firefight angry and worried patients with very few resources or reassurances or specific therapies.


Still, private doctors are already currently working very hard with the Ministry to curb this disease, so naturally they will do their part, under such unusual stresses. There has been good cooperation from all private doctors as far as the MMA is concerned. Clearly, there had been some confusion in the earlier phase of this outbreak, which was due to rapidly changing scenarios and policies. All of us are learning as we face this unprecedented disease on the run…


Some of our doctors and their clinic staff have even become infected by this flu, but thankfully so far we have not received any news of more serious consequences such as death. So private doctors are also exposed to this threat but continue to look after their patients, including very many people with flu-like illness.


Our private hospitals are already looking after some seriously ill patients, including some requiring intensive care or mechanical ventilation—so yes, we have been prepared and are aggressively managing this pandemic. We note that thus far, our flu patients have emerged well after their ordeal, at least those who have come to us in the main urban areas.


It is possible that smaller private medical centres may not be adequately staffed or equipped to handle more seriously ill respiratory failure patients, but this is also the similar situation in some smaller district hospitals of the public sector. Furthermore, some of these gravely ill patients would not survive despite the most aggressive treatment strategies, under any circumstances.


3. What are the current/potential problems doctors might be facing in combating the spread of the swine flu?


It would be good if every doctor keeps a constant and close tab on the H1N1 pandemic and remain fully aware of the developments and changes, which are evolving daily. Every doctor has to be learning on the trot, so to speak, to keep up with the progress of this outbreak and its management, so that we can serve our patients better.


Logging into the Internet regularly for more updated information will certainly help, instead of lamenting that not enough is being disseminated via the media thus far…. Every doctor has to be more proactive and practice more responsible and cautious medical professionalism during this trying period, which is expected to run into at least one to two years. Importantly, they must assiduously look out for lung complications, quickly identify high-risk profiles and refer these patients promptly for further more specialized care.


Easier access to antiviral drugs and their responsible use and monitoring would help allay public fears of delayed treatment, but this should be tampered with care and not with over-exuberance to dish out to one and all. There is genuine fear that the precious antiviral drug might be used indiscriminately, just for prevention – this would be a very bad move, which could inadvertently create a worse outcome of drug resistant bugs!


However, in the light of the very quick deterioration of some young patients who have died, it might be prudent to use antiviral treatment earlier and more aggressively.


We look forward to the specific H1N1 vaccine, when it does come our way, probably towards the end of the year. In the meantime, encouraging those in the front line, heart or lung patents and frequent travelers to have the seasonal flu vaccination is a useful adjunct to help stem the usual problems from other flu types.



Health Insurances Agencies not willing to reimburse hospital care costs for Pandemic Flu

We are facing some problems with health insurance companies, however. This is especially the case in private hospitals, where many insurance companies are refusing to reimburse for the treatment because it appears that in the contract for medical insurance, pandemic illness is excluded. Thus we have lots of problems from ill patients having to find alternative sources of funding!


We strongly urge the insurers to be more magnanimous and empathetic and help out more under such crises. Corporate social responsibility should not be limited to only green or conservation issues—human lives and humane compassion should clearly be a greater mandate! It is good that Etiqa Health insurance has come forward to state publicly that the H1N1 flu is a reimbursable illness. We urge other health insurers to follow suit. Otherwise, our hands are tied somewhat in helping to deliver the best care possible.


4. Is the government’s current logistical capacity able to handle this outbreak or worse a second/third wave of the flu as predicted?

It is difficult to say at this time. Although we certainly hope that this second or third wave would not take place. It is almost a certainty that the community spread of the A(H1N1) flu in Malaysia would escalate, and more and more Malaysians will come down with this flu.


However, the MMA wishes to reiterate that most of these infections would be quite mild and require only symptomatic treatment, bed rest and close watch at home. Only a minority (perhaps 2-5%) may require hospital care or more. If these very severe complications occur in a staggered manner then, we can cope with the problem.


But if a huge unprecedented outbreak of very severe complications does take place, this can easily overwhelm the system. But contingency plans of converting general wards to intensive care capacities, or even field hospitals, have been made.


There are also more structured plans to increase the country’s intensive care bed capacity to at least twice the current number available now (which is around 300 beds only!) However, training sufficient staff and specialists to handle such expert care may require more time and expert guidance.

5. Have there been problems translating policy to ground-level implementation?

MMA’s concern is that although we have had some very detailed and stringent policies and directives in place, there may be logistical gaps in translating down these expected high levels or standards of care, horizontally.


We expect that there might be some variation in the care quality, appropriateness or speed of care delivery at more peripheral healthcare facilities, but this should be kept to a minimum when everyone has a chance to learn very fast and acquire the skills more quickly.


But because some flu patients appear to deteriorate so fast, we have to heighten our vigilance and react more urgently to try and save more lives. But even in most developed countries in the west, some people would continue to succumb to this illness (some 300,000 to 500,000 flu patients die yearly, especially during winter of seasonal flu, around the world).


How can we do this better? Very difficult. However, we urge everyone to be very alert and pay exceptional attention to this pandemic and its development. Doctors both from public and private healthcare sectors must be kept in the loop of information, continuous training and preparedness, so that they can deliver the medical care at the optimum level to help reduce complications and deaths.


6. Should all doctors advise their patients to self quarantine if they display symptoms?


Yes, this is the message that we have been advocating; it is best for all doctors to advise their patients to self-quarantine if they display flu-like symptoms. This is the first and basic step in curbing the spread of the disease.


Last week, I remember informing a young coughing patient who came to my heart clinic, that she should probably come back later when she was better, because her complaint was not serious, but she was incensed, and was upset when I told her to self-quarantine for at least one week. She flatly refused although I was willing to give her MC for the week. My concern is that my other heart patients might contract the ailment due to her less than prudent action, and then their conditions may compound to a higher risk for complications!


We have to encourage everyone to be more socially responsible. Wear a mask, don’t touch it too often, if you need to go out, or even to visit your doctor when you think you have possible flu-like illness. Wash your hands frequently or use hand sanitisers to reduce the contamination chances to others. Avoid shaking hands, perhaps practice the Japanese bow to acknowledge each other!


However, we should also not be too panicky. Be vigilant, be cautious, be socially responsible, and think of others too.

7. How are private doctors/clinics kept informed about how to deal with A(H1N1) patients? (Some clinics claim they don’t receive anything from the MOH, while others admit to receiving some guidelines. This is very inconsistent). Is MMA doing anything to ensure that all doctors get the same information?


We have sent out MOH bulletins through our website, but not directly to each clinic or medical practitioner. Logistically, sending paper bulletins on a nearly daily basis is too cumbersome and costly, and likely to be not very helpful as these become obsolete so quickly. Members have also received clearer more defined updates in our monthly MMA News (Berita MMA), but these are usually not timely enough.


We urge members and doctors to check with the internet for more up-to-date news and modifications in guidelines to managing this pandemic.


Thus, there are no standardized bulletins as mentioned above. However, on the part of the MMA, we have been posting circulars, guidelines, important notices, etc to our doctors via our website – www.mma.org.my. There is also the official MOH site for the H1N1 flu, http://www.h1n1.moh.gov.my.


We have also informed our members to log-in to my personal blogsite for updates: http://myhealth-matters.blogspot.com/ Some of our other members have also been writing articles on the disease in our monthly newsletter – Berita MMA.


Besides, there is extensive coverage in the electronic and print media about the disease and its evolving status, daily.


We urge everyone to be more proactive and impress upon himself or herself, to look into more relevant information by themselves in the world wide web.


This pandemic situation is so fluid that one has to be keeping pace actively to remain engaged and up-to-date.


8. Would the MMA describe the current A(H1N1) Pandemic as ‘out of control’?


At this juncture, the MMA does not believe that the situation is out of control and that we need any health curfew. The Minister of Health yesterday announced that the government would only consider declaring a health curfew if the mortality rate due to Influenza A (H1N1) outbreak goes above 0.4 per cent. According to their calculations, currently, the country’s mortality rate is between 0.1 per cent and 0.4 per cent.


Some have suggested that we shut down the country by imposing a nationwide health emergency lock down. But this is quite futile, as the disease is already in place within the community. Also, how long should this go on, one week, ten days, or longer?


What about the economic implications and the day-to-day running of the country and businesses? Also what happens when another surge appears again? Do we need to have repeated cycles of national curfew? Therefore, it makes no practical sense to even consider this seriously at this time, the actual numbers while alarming to some, are still manageable.



9. So why do the growing numbers seem to imply that we are getting more and more infections, with what appears as a disproportionate number of deaths?


There is no clear or adequate answer to this. I do not believe that the MOH is to blame for the forthright transparency, which it has been practicing right from the outset of this outbreak. We have released all the data almost daily in full view of our public. In fact earlier on, it should be remembered that the MOH was accused of being too alarmist and even guilty of scaremongering, driving away businesses and tourists!


There is organisational acknowledgement that our viral testing may have been less than adequate, and there have been long queues and frustrations from many worried iflu-like patients. Some had also been sent home, where no tests were offered, and therefore felt abandoned and treated less than expected.


Thus, there were/are many ill flu patients in the community, where no confirmatory tests had been performed. This gross under-reporting would therefore to add to the lower numbers of laboratory-proved or confirmed A(H1N1) flu, reported.


The WHO has estimated that for every confirmed case, there are at least another 20 patients who would have been infected. This means that most of these are not serious enough to be counted—many would have had mild or even no symptoms. Thus, in this context, the actual numbers with this pandemic flu would have been grossly underestimated.


So, it is unfair to state that the MOH is manipulating the numbers to justify the growing death rate, which we have already predicted would happen simply based on the attack rate of this very contagious flu.


We must inform the public that this pandemic will continue for at least another year or two, with the intensity likely to become less serious and less feared with time, unless the dreaded second wave of reassortment into a more virulent form of the H1N1 virus takes place.


There is no indication that this second wave has taken place yet, even in Mexico, USA or UK or Australia.


Although Mexico has declared that its worst is over, it is probably more a local nationalistic perception than the actual truth—there are still reports of continuing flu-like illness being reported, but like most authorities the Mexican government has taken the position of not confirming the actual attack rate any more. This less than rigorous case reporting is mainly done to allay irrational public fears.


A recent report (Seeking lessons in swine flu fight, 10 August, 2009, NY Times) by a visiting American expert noted that in the Mexican/Latin American situation, the flu characteristics might have become less typical, with many not developing fever in as many as 30-50%, but that some of these still go on to develop more serious lung complications.


Dr. Wenzel, a former president of the International Society for Infectious Diseases, said he had observed a broad spectrum of illness from human swine influenza: people who experienced few or no symptoms to those who rapidly developed complications and died. Thus, like anywhere else, this flu will continue to exert its toll, but perhaps in a less alarming manner, once the public overcomes the initial fear and alarm…


Also the complication rates appear to have plateaued and most health authorities have learnt to cope with this, and the expected number of deaths. The scenario in Malaysia is probably still evolving with the peak still to come, but I would predict that the mortality rate would become less frightening as we cope with the complications better.


Even in the USA, the number of A(H1N1) flu is estimated to be in the millions as of now, but most are really quite mild disease and therefore not so scary. More worrisome in the northern hemisphere would be the winter months when this flu might exert its more serious effects, yet.


In Malaysia, it is possible that many more Malaysians have come into contact with this flu and are suffering very mildly from this, and most have got better without much concern. It is those few who seem to get complications so quickly that makes us so afraid, may be too afraid.


But, like most communicable diseases, we will overcome this outbreak in time, but we need to be patient, vigilant, be socially responsible and work together.


There is little to be gained from scapegoating anyone, be they the governmental machinery, the MOH, doctors or our politicians. We would all be better served by refraining from too many knee-jerk, alarmist or partisan responses.


The MMA is organising an urgent National A(H1N1) Pandemic Influenza Conference on 12 September 2009, to help disseminate and share more scientific and practical up-to-date information about this novel influenza. The mass media will be invited to participate and help learn and educate our citizens more about this dreaded outbreak.

Thursday, August 20, 2009

H1N1: No more health declarations at checkpoints

H1N1: No more health declarations at checkpoints

2009/08/20

By Hamidah Atan

PUTRAJAYA: The Health Ministry has stopped conducting health declarations at airports and other entry points since last week.

This was because the number of locally-transmitted influenza A (H1N1)cases was more than imported cases, according to deputy Health director-general Datuk Dr Ramlee Rahmat.

However, scanners and medical staff would remain at airports, especially the Kuala Lumpur International Airport.

In the early stage of the outbreak, it was compulsory for inbound travelers to fill the health declaration forms.

Wednesday, August 19, 2009

H1N1: Health curfew 'a last resort'

Health curfew 'a last resort'

2009/08/18

Annie Freeda Cruez and Shuhada Elis

H1N1 situation 'manageable', people advised to play their part in preventing the disease from spreading.

KUALA LUMPUR: “No” to health curfew.

Both the National Security Council and the Health Ministry said the situation in the country was manageable, with the influenza A (H1N1) mortality rate at only 0.007 per cent.

National Security Council director-general Datuk Mohamed Thajudeen Abdul Wahab told the New Straits Times that declaring a curfew would be the last resort, where the situation had reached the worst case scenario.


“We are far from that level,” he said.

On Monday, Health Minister Datuk Seri Liow Tiong Lai said the H1N1 outbreak was a “national health emergency” and the government would consider a curfew should the mortality rate rise above 0.4 per cent.

Thajudeen said several agencies, including the council, were working closely with the Health Ministry to monitor the situation.

“We have been having regular meetings with the ministry, some
times more than once a week,” he said.

He added that the government needed cooperation from the public
to curb the spread of the virus and asked those who were sick to quarantine themselves.

Health director-general Tan Sri Dr Ismail Merican, appearing on a
NSTLive session at Balai Berita yesterday, said the ministry would not advise the government to impose a health curfew just yet.

He said a health curfew would not stop the virus from spreading.

“You impose a curfew for one or two weeks, what do you do after
that? Continue with the curfew or stop it? Let’s say you stop it but do you think the virus will just go away?

“The virus is not going to go away, it is going to stay for a long time.”

Dr Ismail said a health curfew would not improve the situation.

“Rather than impose a health curfew, it will be better if all Malaysians played their part in delaying the spread of the disease while the ministry concentrated on giving treatment.”

He felt strongly that there was a lot more that the ministry could do, through the cooperation of the public, corporate bodies, business enterprises and others, to delay the spread of the disease.

Dr Ismail said Malaysians should go on with their normal life but strictly adhere to personal hygiene, such as washing their hands with soap and water and using hand sanitiser, to avoid being infected.

"Please wear your face mask if you are sick. By doing so, you will protect others from being infected," he said, adding that Malaysians could demand for a national health emergency or health curfew.

But he warned that if they were not disciplined enough, then all the measures put in place would not help in containing the H1N1.

Malaysian Medical Association president Dr David K.L. Quek concurred with the decision, saying that the World Health Organisation and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in the United States had never mentioned a curfew.

He said Mexico, which announced a one-week curfew in May to contain the virus, only did so because they did not know what they were facing as the virus was then new.

Yesterday, the Health Ministry recorded three more deaths, raising the death toll to 67 with 4,501 confirmed cases.

Dr Ismail said 276 H1N1 patients were being treated in hospitals nationwide and that 36 were in intensive care units. Of those in the ICUs, 21 are in the high-risk category and suffering from various complications due to their illnesses.

Monday, August 17, 2009

Australian community’s attitude towards H1N1 flu pandemic

Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Abstract

Objective: To ascertain the beliefs, perceived risks and initial attitudes of the Australian community towards the influenza pandemic declared by the World Health Organization in response to the emergence of an A(H1N1) influenza subtype.

Design, setting and participants:
Cross-sectional survey of Sydney residents during WHO Phase 5 of pandemic (H1N1) 2009. Members of the public were approached in shopping and pedestrian malls in seven areas of Sydney between 2 May and 29 May 2009 to undertake the survey. The survey was also made available by email.

Main outcome measures:













Perceived personal risk and seriousness of the disease, opinion on the government and health authorities’ response, feelings about quarantine and infection control methods, and potential compliance with antiviral prophylaxis.

Results:
  • Of 620 respondents, 596 (96%) were aware of pandemic (H1N1) 2009,
  • but 44% (273/620) felt they did not have enough information about the situation.
  • More than a third (38%; 235/620) ranked their risk of catching influenza during a pandemic as low.
  • When asked how they felt pandemic influenza would affect their health if they were infected, only a third (33%; 206/620) said “very seriously”.
  • Just over half of the respondents (58%; 360/620) believed the pandemic would be over within a year.
  • Respondents rated quarantine and vaccination with a pandemic vaccine as more effective than hand hygiene for the prevention of pandemic influenza.
Conclusions:

Emphasising the efficacy of recommended actions (such as hand hygiene), risks from the disease and the possible duration of the outbreak may help to promote compliance with official advice.

STOP PRESS: Latest Guidelines from Australian TaskForce on H1N1 Flu

Position Statement of Abstract
  • To date, there have been thousands of cases of H1N1 influenza 09 (human swine influenza) worldwide, with established community transmission in parts of Australia.
  • Timely diagnostic tests can enable targeted antiviral treatment early in the course of the pandemic. Rapid antigen tests will be less useful once the pandemic is established.

  • Recommendations for use of antiviral treatment for influenza:

    • Neuraminidase inhibitors (oseltamivir and zanamivir) are the antiviral agents of choice for H1N1 influenza 09.

    • In otherwise healthy children and adults with confirmed or suspected influenza, antiviral treatment is of greatest benefit when given within 48 hours of symptom onset.

    • Treatment should be prioritised for patients with risk factors for severe disease, such as older people (> 65 years), pregnant women, patients with chronic disease (eg, asthma, cardiorespiratory disease, diabetes and renal failure) or immunosuppression, and young children.

    • Antiviral treatment can be given to children as young as 1 year. However, animal studies suggest central nervous system accumulation of oseltamivir in infants <>

    • Antiviral treatment should be offered to pregnant women with suspected or confirmed influenza because of the risk of severe disease in this group; there is limited evidence suggesting safety during pregnancy.

    • Antiviral treatment should be given to hospitalised patients with severe influenza infection (especially pneumonia), even > 48 hours after symptom onset. Antibiotics should be given to such patients according to established guidelines for community-acquired pneumonia.

  • Recommendations for use of antiviral prophylaxis:

    • Antiviral prophylaxis can be given to health care workers and close contacts of patients with influenza following exposure, and to residents of institutions to terminate outbreaks. Contacts not provided with prophylaxis should have access to early treatment with antiviral agents.

    • Long-term prophylaxis can be given to “first responder” health care workers for durations of up to 6 weeks for oseltamivir and 4 weeks for zanamivir. Use of antiviral prophylaxis for these groups should be in the context of agreement to use the national stockpile.

Friday, August 14, 2009

NST Online Private doctors, staff also hit by H1N1

NST Online Private doctors, staff also hit by H1N1















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Managing schools during the current pandemic (H1N1) 2009

Managing schools during the current pandemic (H1N1) 2009 – Reactive and proactive school closures in Europe (European Centre for Disease Prevention & Control, ECDC)

Proactive school closures, that is, closing schools ahead of a pandemic arriving in an area, is a public health measure that has been commonly suggested for mitigating the impact of pandemics. It has been suggested that they could help because children are considered to be more infectious and susceptible to seasonal influenza than adults and can therefore be important vectors of transmission. Similarly, the high contact rates among children in schools favour transmission.[1,2] This is an area that is addressed with other public health measures in the ECDC ‘Menu’ on Public Health Measures.

Here it is important to distinguish between proactive closures of schools (which means closing schools just as, or even before, they are affected by a pandemic) and reactive closures, which occur simply because many students or staff are sick and the schools cannot function for a while (Table 1).

It was hoped by some that closing schools proactively during a pandemic may break some chains of transmission and so reduce the total number of cases. This would, to some extent, slow the epidemic, giving a little more time for final preparations and vaccine development and production, as well as reducing the incidence of cases at the peak of the epidemic. The latter effect in particular, would limit both the stress on healthcare systems and peak absenteeism in the general population.

However, though some health benefits can be expected, there is still considerable debate about if, when and how, proactive school closure policy should be implemented.[3]

There is no consensus on the scale of the benefits to be expected but the most recent scientific review addressing the general issue, conducted by a European group of authors from the UK, France, Sweden and ECDC, concluded that proactive school closures could indeed be beneficial in the ways described above, but only if the children do not simply mix elsewhere outside the schools.[4]

Any benefits, however substantial, must be weighed against the potential high economic and social costs of proactively closing schools.[3,4] Particularly critical may be the negative impact of unplanned school closures on key health workers since, for example, many doctors and nurses are also parents with dependent children.[4]

There are also many important operational issues related to school closures which, though not insuperable, need careful preparation. It is also important to remember the many educational and social functions that schools deliver which would be lost, especially by prolonged closures (Table 2).

The current pandemic (H1N1) 2009 is proving especially challenging when considering school closures. The heterogeneous and unpredictable distribution of outbreaks and the mild nature of the illness in most people means that, by the time it becomes clear that the infection is in a school, it is too late for a proactive closure.

For example, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in North America, has moved away from recommending that authorities consider proactive closures. The CDC is also emphasising the importance of local flexibility and local decisions.[2,5]

Within Europe there are different traditions with regard to school closures, and schools and school systems are often administratively complex bodies not necessarily under a single national authority. Communication of the policies to the public presents particular challenges in a European context where some countries (or even regions within a country) may close schools proactively, others perhaps only reactively and some not close them at all. In their paper published in The Lancet, the authors point out that historical experience shows that some schools close during pandemics just because of high levels of illness-related absenteeism. That has been the experience to date in North America.[4,6] It therefore seems sensible for countries and schools to at least have plans for reactive closures.

Table 1: Definitions and types of school closure

School closure: Closing a school and sending all the children and staff home.
Class dismissal: A school remains open with administrative staff but most children stay home.
Reactive closure: Closing a school when many children and/or staff are experiencing illness.
Proactive closure: School closure or class dismissal before significant transmission among the school children occurs.

Table 2: Operational questions concerning school closure to be considered during pandemic (H1N1) 2009

  • The need for local sensitivity in timing in larger countries as the pandemic spreads; even if proactive school closures are considered desirable, it will not be necessary for all schools to close in all parts of a country at once, despite the communication and administrative advantages of doing so.
  • What should be the trigger for proactive closures? Some suggested triggers are:
    • The first case/outbreak involving the pandemic strain confirmed in a child or teacher.
    • Outbreaks in neighbouring/nearby schools.
  • What should be the trigger for re-opening? Low levels of transmission in surrounding community?
  • What should be the recommended length of time of closure?
  • How to sustain teaching and learning over prolonged periods of closure, especially for pupils approaching examinations.
  • How to maintain contact between the schools and families and teachers; the advantages of ‘class dismissal’ over ‘school closures’.
  • Anticipate group childcare arrangements so that any healthcare benefits are not undermined; consider organised approaches to alternative childcare.
  • How to sustain vital social functions of some schools, especially with regard to disadvantaged and vulnerable families.
  • Consider the major complexities of school systems that comprise state schools, independent schools, faith-based schools and the fact that decisions on school closures are often a matter for local not central government, i.e. some European countries find it much harder than others to have command and control relations with schools.
  • Consider the potential loss of earning of parents who have to take time off work.
  • Establish agreements between sectors (such as education and health) so that one does not undermine the other.
  • Consider the communication issues inherent in explaining different policies in neighbouring countries or even adjoining administrations.
  • Consider early warning mechanisms so that adjoining administrations are aware of imminent decisions.
  • Should Tertiary (Higher) Education and pre-school care be included?

References

  1. Glass RJ, Glass LM, Beyeler WE, Min HJ. Targeted social distancing design for pandemic influenza. Emerging Infectious Diseases 2006;12(11):1671-1681.
  2. CDC United States Department of Health and Human Services and Centers for Disease Prevention and Control. Interim pre-pandemic planning guidance: Community strategy for pandemic influenza Mitigation in the United States. Dec 2006
  3. Inglesby TV, Nuzzo JB, O'Toole T, Henderson DA. Disease mitigation measures in the control of pandemic influenza. Biosecur Bioterror 2006;4(4):366-75
  4. Cauchemez S, Ferguson NM, Wachtel C, Tegnell A, Saour G, Duncan B, et al. Closure of schools during an influenza pandemic. Lancet Infect Dis 2009; 9: 473–81.
  5. CDC Update on School (K – 12) and Child Care Programs: Interim CDC Guidance in Response to Human Infections with the Novel Influenza A (H1N1) Virus
  6. Weisfuse I. Presentation to ECDC on Outbreak of Influenza A(H1N1)v in New York